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Abstract
The authors use a  large data set from  Ethiopia that  The large productivity  effect of terracing implies that,
differentiates  tenure security and transferability  to  even  where households undertake  investments to
explore determinants  of different types of land-related  increase  their tenure security, this may not be socially
investment and its possible  impact on productivity.  efficient.  In Ethiopia, government action  to increase
While they find some support for endogeneity  of  tenure security and transferability  of land  rights can
investment  in trees, this is not the case for terraces.  significantly  enhance  rural investment  and productivity.
Transfer  rights are unambiguously  investment-enhancing.
This paper-a product of Rural Development, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to assess
the impact of land policy on equity and productive development. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank,
1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Maria Fernandez,  room MC3-542, telephone 202-473-3766,
fax 202-522-1151,  email address mfernandez2@worldbank.org.  Policy Research  Working Papers are also posted on the
Web  at http://econ.worldbank.org.  Klaus Deimnger may  be contacted  at kdeininger@worldbank.org.  March  2003.  (28
pages)
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1. Introduction
Property rights to land that are secure and easily transferable have  long been identified as a key element to
bring about higher levels of investment and access to credit, facilitate reallocation of production factors  to
maximize  allocative  efficiency  in  resource  use,  and  allow the  development  of an  off-farm economy.  In
fact, the way in which property rights  to land are allocated can  have  far-reaching  impacts on other social
outcomes  (Nugent and Robinson 2002; Banerjee and Iyer 2002; Conning  and Robinson 2002)  and there is
agreement  that providing  the basis  for secure  and transferable land  rights is an important function  of the
state.  However,  the  literature  on  this  issue  in  Africa  has  yielded  inconclusive  results.  In fact,  a  large
number of studies which often equated tenure  security  with  possession of formal  title found little impact
on  either  credit  access  or  investment  (Migot-Adholla  et  al.  1994).  More  recently,  there  is  evidence
suggesting  that the causality  may run  the other way,  i.e.  that investment  may be  undertaken  to enhance
tenure  security  rather  than as a response  to higher  levels of tenure  security  (Besley  1995;  Sjaastad  and
Bromley  1997).  Descriptive evidence seems to be consistent with this hypothesis (Gray and Kevane  2001;
Platteau  1996).  In  fact,  in Burkina  Faso,  land-related  investment  appears  to be undertaken  primarily  to
increase tenure security rather than as a consequence of more  secure rights (Brasselle et al. 2002).
This  raises  a  number  of  issues  with  potentially  far-reaching  consequences  for  policy,  especially  in
predominantly  agrarian  economies  in Africa where  rural productivity,  investment,  and the functioning  of
factor markets  will need to improve  significantly  to overcome  pervasive  poverty.  Does the endogeneous
nature  of land-related  investment  imply  that there  is no  need  for governments  to  take  steps  that  would
increase  households'  tenure  security?  Or  are  the  "tenure-building"  strategies  adopted  by farmners  just a
stop-gap  measure  that  is  used  because  government  interventions  to  provide  basic  tenure  security  and
transferable  property  rights  are  ineffective  - thus  illustrating  the  need  for  government  intervention  to
increase  tenure security? In other words,  should African governments  be less concerned about land tenure
because households  are managing  on their own or is the fact that producers have to resort to such action  asign  that  government  is  not  actually  fulfilling  its  functions?  Answering  this  question  will  require  to
identify the magnitude of the investment  effect of more secure  tenure and the channels bringing it about.
In this paper,  we  conduct  such analysis  for the  specific  case of Ethiopia. Conceptually,  we build on  the
model that has been underlying most earlier studies by assuming that rights to transfer land are exogenous
whereas  tenure security  may be  enhanced by land-related  (visible)  investment.  A  first prediction  arising
from this is  that greater transferability  will, in virtually all  situations, be associated  with higher levels  of
investment.  Second,  the endogenous nature of tenure  security implies that investment  can be undertaken
not  only  to  increase  productivity  but  also  to  enhance  tenure  security.  Thus,  the  net  impact  of tenure
security on  investment  is ambiguous;  it would be positive if the productivity  effect were to outweigh  the
tenure  security  effect  and negative  otherwise.  As the relative  magnitude  of these  two effects  can  not be
determined  a priori,  and would  arguably vary  over time,  space, and  even types of investment  within the
same locality,  empirical evidence  is needed.
We provide  such  evidence by  drawing  on  a nationally representative  data  set from Ethiopia that is both
larger  and richer  than  what  has been  used  in  the  literature.  To  assess the  impact  of differences  in the
relative importance  of the tenure security  and productivity effect, we use information  on whether specific
investments  were undertaken  since  1999.  Two types of such investment  are  distinguished,  one of which,
planting of trees,  is highly visible  and can therefore be used to manifest property rights,  and another  one,
establishment  or  maintenance  of terraces,  which  is more  productivity-enhancing  and  less  immediately
visible. Tenure security is measured by village-level  or individual experience  of a land reallocation  before
1999  and  by  households'  expectations  about  future  reallocations  at  the  village-level.  Transferability  is
proxied by respondents'  subjective  assessment of whether they will be able to transfer their land through
mortgage or sale.
Our results  are  in  line  with the recent  literature by  confirming  that the  impact  of tenure  security  varies
across  types of investment;  insecure  tenure (as  measured  by past  redistribution)  encourages  planting  of
trees but discourages  terracing. At the same time,  both the perception  of future  risk of redistribution  and
lower levels  of transferability  clearly  reduce  the propensity  to invest,  especially in  non-visible  activities
that can enhance future  productivity.  The effects  found are not only highly significant statistically but also
of considerable  magnitude;  eliminating  the risk of future  redistribution and  resolving conflicts  over land
with local authorities would increase  the propensity to invest in terraces by 28%; making land rights fully
transferable  is predicted to  add an  additional  38%. The  fact  that the impact  on planting of trees is much
smaller (4% and 7%, respectively,  for the two types of interventions)  suggests that,  in addition  to limited
variation  in levels of tenure security, large part of the failure to find a significant impact of tenure security
in the literature  may have  been due to a focus on short-term investments.
2To assess  the potential  impact which changes  in property  rights may have  on investment  incentives  and
thus  productivity  of land  use,  we  estimate  a  net  farm  income  function  containing  the  investments  in
question.  Use  of the  predicted  levels  of investment  with  and  without  higher  levels  of tenure  security
suggests  that  changes  in  the  property  rights  regime  could  have  a  quantitatively  large  impact  on  rural
productivity.  Credible  elimination  of the risk of redistribution  and resolution  is  estimated  to result  in  a
1.5%  increase in  net farm  income  and full transferabilit  of land rights would greatly increase  the extent
of benefits,  by an additional 4.4%. Compared  to an average  rate of growth of agricultural  value  added of
3.34% over the last decade of economic  liberalization (as compared to growth of 0.84%  for the decade of
the  1980s),1  these  are  large  figures that could considerably  enhance  the value of the asset endowment  of
the poor.  Moreover,  as we considering only investments  in terracing and abstract  from gains in allocative
efficiency  likely to come about with more secure and transferable land rights, implying that our estimate is
a lower  bound of the  true impact of tenure  security.  This illustrates  the continuing  high levels  of tenure
insecurity  and the  scope  for  land  policy to  make  a  significant  contribution  to poverty  reduction  in this
country.  Methodologically,  this  suggests  that  some  of the  conclusions  derived  in  the  literature  on  the
subject may have to be revisited.
The paper  is structured  as follows.  Section  two provides  a brief review  of the  literature,  a discussion  of
land  tenure  arrangements  in  Ethiopia,  the  conceptual  model  and  the  estimation  strategy.  Section  three
discusses  data source and descriptive  statistics. The econometric  results, both for the determinants  of land
related investment and the simulation  of the impact of greater tenure security,  via investment, on net farn
income are presented in section four. Section  five closes with a number of  policy  implications.
2.  Conceptual Model  and Econometric  Approach
To provide the conceptual framework  for our empirical  approach,  we put investment decisions  within  the
context of a standard two-period household model. Regarding the impact of tenure security on agricultural
production,  we  distinguish between  security  and transferability  of land  rights. We note that the standard
result  of  higher  tenure  security  leading  to  higher  investment  will  hold  if  investment  is  to  increase
productivity  but that the  impact  becomes  ambiguous  if investment  is also  undertaken  to  enhance  future
tenure security. By contrast, the impact of greater transferability  of land rights, at any given level of tenure
security,  is unambiguously positive  as it allows farmers  to capitalize  on their investment  even  if they are
not able to self-cultivate in the second period.
Data on agncultural  value added are from  the World Bank's  World Development  Indicators.
32.1 Background  and motivation
The importance  of secure and transferable  land rights to provide the incentives  for long-term  investment
and decisions based on  such investments  has long been recognized.  Where tenure is insecure,  functioning
of land markets  (and off farm migration) as well as use of land as collateral will be impaired and the risk
of losing land will create a disincentive  for households  to undertake  investments even if the present  value
of the productivity benefits  from such investments  would,  under full tenure  security,  be higher than their
cost.  This implies  that, even  in situations where,  for example  due to lack of credit markets,  there is little
scope  for  land  ownership  to  increase  credit  supply,  one  would  expect  tenure  security  to  increase
investment.  Indeed, significant investment effects of land title are reported from Latin America (Deininger
and Chamorro  2002; Carter  and Olinto 2002;  Lopez  1997;  Lanjouw and Levy  1998; Alston et al. 1995;
Alston et al. 1996) and Asia (Feder  1988; Do and Iyer 2002). These results have been used to justify large
scale intervention in titling programs to  increase owners'  tenure  security and provide the basis for formal
market transactions  and use of land as collateral in credit markets. Studies show that public investment in
titling can be financially  self-sustaining (Brits et al. 2002).
This strong evidence  in favor of a positive investment impact of higher levels of tenure security  in many
parts of the world sharply contrasts to the experience in Africa which has led observes to characterize the
impact of awarding title as, at best, "unimportant" (Pinckney and Kimuyu 1994).  The reason is that titling
was generally  found to have  little or no effect on investment and subsequent farm income (Atwood  1990;
Carter and Wiebe 1990;  Migot-Adholla  1993;  Migot-Adholla et al. 1994). Moreover,  a number of studies
have  argued,  both conceptually  and  empirically,  that  households  undertake  investments  that  can range
from marking  of boundaries and planting of trees and hedges  to the building of houses  or sheds, with the
primary  purpose  of establishing  more  secure  property  rights  to land  (Brasselle  et al. 2002;  Gray  and
Kevane 2001; Place and Otsuka 200 1).2
This, together with the finding of a statistically significant but quantitatively  small impact of higher levels
of tenure security by a number of studies  from China (Carter and Yao 2002; Jacoby et aL 2002;  Li et al.
1998) has led observers to conclude that interventions to improve tenure security may be misguided (Kung
2000; Kung 2002)  or at least less important  (Dong 1996),  a claim  that is hotly disputed by others  (Chen
and Davis 1998).  This has far-reaching  implications  for policy especially in Asian countries such as China
and Vietnam where  households  have only use  rights to land  and there  is considerable  policy discussion
about the scope of improving productivity  by enhancing the security or transferability  of these rights. This
2 The existing literature does not give a clear-cut  answer to the question whether this implies that there is no need  for mechanisms to exogenously
increase the  level of tenure secunty enjoyed by households or whether the fact that households undertake  investment to  increase tenure secunty
an  indication of their low expectations  regarding the state's  ability to provide them  with more  secure property nghts  For example  in Cameroon,
while there is a demand  for hlgher tenure secunty, the fact that govemment programs  were able to only partially satisfy it prompted households to
search for less expensive ways to increase tenure security (Firmin-Sellers  and Sellers  1999).
4is in sharp contrast to the significant impacts of giving secure  control rights to producers  in other settings
(Banerjee  et aL  2002;  Banerjee  2001).  The  policy  relevance  of the  issue,  and  the  lack of conclusive
evidence on this subject, would make in-depth study of this subject for Africa of particular importance.
Although  a  large  number  of studies  have  aimed  to  address  this  question,  they  are  affected  to varying
degrees by  three main  shortcomings.  First, in  the absence  of exogenous  variation,  most studies rely  on
indicators of tenure  security which are, at best, a noisy measure for the variable of interest.  For example,
variation  in  the length for which  a plot has been used could, in the presence  of a legally  stipulated fixed
length  of ownership,  indicate  either high  or  low levels of tenure  security  (Jacoby  et al. 2002).  Also, as
many  investments  mature  slowly,  making  it difficult  to  clearly disentangle  cause  and effect,  especially
where tenure security is subjective making it difficult to obtain precise retrospective  information.  Second,
it is not clear that results obtained  for relatively minor "investments"  such as application  of manure (Yao
1996;  Li  et al. 1998;  Jacoby  et al. 2002)  carry  over  to  ventures  that  are  of a larger-scale.  In  fact,  if
anything one would expect tenure security to be much more important for large-scale  investment. Finally,
much  of the  literature  is  characterized  by  small  samples.  Both  the  smaller  sample  size  and  the  more
limited  variation  in  land rights  which this implies  would tend  to bias coefficient  estimates towards  zero
(Deaton  1997).
2.2 Conceptual Model
We  use a  standard  two-period  household  model  to  assess  the  impact  of greater tenure  security  and  of
higher transferability  on  land-related  investment  as the conceptual  basis  for our empirical  investigation.
We  show  that,  with  exogenous  tenure  security,  more  secure  land  rights  will  have  an  unambiguously
positive impact on  investment,  this is  no longer true if it is acknowledged  that investment can be used to
increase  tenure-security.  While  investments  such  as  fencing  whose  only  purpose  is  to  enhance  tenure
security, without any impact on productivity  would,  in this case, be negatively related  to higher levels of
tenure  security,  the  relationship  becomes  ambiguous  for  investments  with  a potential  to both  enhance
security  and productivity.  At the same time, higher levels of transfer rights, modeled as a reduction in the
transaction cost of land rental in the second period,  will always increase  the benefits  from investments and
thus  the  incentives  for  spending  time  and  effort  on  such  activity  in the  first  period.  We  present  key
elements of the model below, referring to the annex for a more elaborate version.
Consider  a two-period  model  where  households  are endowed  with identical amounts  of land A, labor in
each of the periods ( L 1 and  L2), and initial capital Kn. Utility is defined on consumption  in any period, c,
by a standard utility function of the form  U(c,, c2) = In (cd + an (cd)  where  Sis a discount factor.  Income
can be derived either from spending time r in off-farm employment at a given exogenous wage rate w, or
5from agricultural production according to a production function y, =f(A , &  Pd  where K, is the stock of
available  capital  and  l,  denotes  the amount of labor time  spent on agricultural  production.  In the initial
period, households can spend time  11i  to  increase the  second-period capital  stock according  to K2 = K, +
g(l,').
3 Tenure  security is given  by p, a variable that denotes  the risk of the  land being redistributed  in
the second period in which case the household will lose all the specific investment  that has been made. As
explained in more detail in the appendix, the household's problem can be reduced  to the maximization of
discounted income
MaxI  K  I  a
,f  I  o,a  . (1+y)(f(Kl,1a)+1,°w)+P(S 2(S 1,'))f(K,  + g(11' ), 12)+12 W 2 =0
'a1,  '  ,1,  ,1,12  ,12
s.t.  11  +10  + I'  SLi, I"  +12  <L2
As the two  labor  constraints  will always  be binding,  we  substitute them into the objective  function and
derive first order conditions as follows:
(Fl)-(1+ y)f'(K 1 ,i  ) +gp(S2 (S 1 ,J)S 2'(S  l / )f(K1 +g(/),la)+a'(Ki  +g(al),12a)g,(l[)p(S2 (Sl,1I) =0
(F2)  f '(KI1,  I)  = w,  and
(F3)  f '(K,  + g(l1  ),  12a)  = w2
The economics  of the FOC equations are quite intuitive; (F2)  and (F3) imply that the marginal product of
labor used in agricultural  production should be equal to the off-farm wage (the marginal opportunity  cost
of working  off-farm)  in  both periods. (FI)  implies  that marginal  cost of making  investments  in the first
period which,  under the above assumptions  equals the wage rate, will be equal to the discounted value of
benefits from doing so.  As can be seen, these benefits  are  composed of two terms,  the marginal  increase
in  tenure  security  (if any)  in  the  second  period  plus  the  marginal  benefit  of the  investment-induced
increase  in  the  capital  for  second-period  production.  Manipulating  FOC  provides  us  with comparative
statics conceming the impact of tenure security on land-related investment under different conditions.
Case 1: If tenure  security  is exogenously given, the standard  case considered in the literature,  the second
part of (F1) will drop out, allowing us to write:
-(1+ y)f'(K1,1 1a)+f'(K, +g(i/),1 )g'(1)p(S 2) = 0
3 While  we  impliitly  assume  that  there  is  zero  depreciation  of capital  to  keep  the  exposition  simple,  accommodating  such depreciation  is
straightforward  conceptually although and will not affect the substantive results.
6Substituting from (F2) and (F3) yields:  -(1+y)w,  + w2g'(l,')p(S2) = 0
And after total differentiation with respect to  1/' and S2 and collection  of terms, we obtain
all' >  0
as2
which is the standard result that higher levels  of tenure security will lead to more  land-related investment
due to the productivity effect.
Case 2:  Consider  the  case  where  p  is  endogenous,  i.e.  can  be  enhanced  through  investment,  but
g(lf ) = 0, i.e. investment do not enhance productivity.  This implies that (Fl) will be replaced with:
-(1  + y)f' (K, Ii")  + p' (S2 (Si I /' )S2 '(S 1,' )f(K1,  2)  0
Substituting  in from (F3) yields - (1  + y)w,  + p' (S2 (SI ,I  l')S 2 '(S, ,i/ )fI(K,, 12)  =2
and total differentiation  with respect to  S,  and  1,' yields, after reorganizing terms:
all' <  0
implying  that,  opposite  from  the  above,  tenure  insecurity  will  lead  to  more  investment  on the  land  as
farmers try to increase  their tenure security.
Case 3: If investment can  increase  productivity  and  future tenure  security, the  impact of tenure security
on investment will be ambiguous.  As shown in the appendix,  total  differentiation  of (F2) with respect to
S, and  Ill,  indicates that the sign of  Dil  is indeterminate,  depending on the relative magnitude of the two
effects.
To analyze  the impact of transfer rights,  we assume that tenure security  is given but that there is non-zero
probability  9 that  after  the  first  period,  the  household  will  be  hit  by  a  shock  that  will  rule out  self-
cultivation  (one  can  think of sickness).  In  this  case,  the  investment  will be  lost  unless  it  is possible  to
transfer the land to another cultivator.  The  solution to the ensuing problem can  found by either applying
bargaining theory (Besley 1995)  or in a framework  of non-zero transaction  costs  (Carter and Yao 1999).
We chose  the latter,  assuming  that rental  (or sales)  markets  are competitive  and  investment  can  actually
be  observed.  In  this  case,  the  market  rent  r  depends  on  the  stock  of  land  investment,  i.e.,
7r = r(K, + g(l/')) but, due  to the  transaction  cost,  owners  forced  to rent out  will receive  only (1-7) r.
Using the above notation and dropping the off-farm  labor market for simplicity yields the problem
max  ,(l+  y)(f  (K',11a)+Of  (K1 +g(l[  ),L 2)+(I-  0)(1-T)r(K, +g(l[))
1,~~~~~~~~~~  I
s.t  a  +11  < L
with first order condition
(1+ r)f,, (K ,L1  -l/)+qfKZ(K 1 +g(lf ),L 2)g'(1,1)+(l-0)(l-T)r'(K 1 +g(l/'))g'(l1)=O
yielding  al  < 0  after total differentiation  with respect to T. This implies that greater transferability  of
land rights will always increase land-related investment.
2.3 Evolution  and status of land tenure in Ethiopia
Ethiopia is of particular  interest,  and appropriate  to test the predictions  from  our model,  for two main
reasons. First,  the country  is characterized  by considerable variation  in tenure security.  Contrary to other
countries  such  as China where,  even though producers  can obtain  only use rights,  the  existing level  of
investment  especially  in  irrigation  is  already  high  (Dong  1996),  most  of Ethiopia's  land  is  rainfed
implying that  there  comparatively  large benefits  can  be had from  land-related  investment.  At the  same
time, land tenure appears to be quite insecure and the rights to transfer land are severely restricted in ways
beyond the control of producers.
In the recent  past,  Ethiopia  implemented  different  types  of interventions  in  the area  of land  tenure  and
reform.  Before  1975,  land  was  concentrated  in  the  hands  of absentee  landlords,  tenure  was  highly
insecure, arbitrary evictions posed a serious threat,  and many lands were severely underutilized.  The land
tenure  system  was  characterized  by  great  inequality  which,  through  its  impact  on  production  and
investment,  not only affected productivity but was also considered to have been the most important cause
of political grievances that eventually led to the overthrow of the regime  (Adal 2001).
Following the overthrow of the imperial regime, the Marxist government (the Derg) transferred ownership
of all rural land to the state for distribution of use rights to cultivators through  local peasant associations
(PAs). The transferability  of rights received was highly restricted; transfer through lease sale, exchange,  or
mortgage,  among others, was prohibited and inheritance  allowed only to immediate  family members. The
ability  to  use  land  was  contingent  on  proof of permanent  physical  residence,  thereby  for  example
preventing  migration.  More  importantly,  tenure  security  was  undermined  by  the  PAs'  and  other
8authorities'  ability to  redistribute land, often for political  reasons,  something that is well documented  for
the case of Amhara (Ege  1997).
The  government taking  power  in  1991,  though  committed to  a free-market  philosophy,  has,  with three
notable  exceptions, made  few substantive  changes  to Ethiopian  farmers'  land rights which are  therefore
still  considered  to  be  quite  inadequate  (Hoben  2000).  First,  land  was  made  a regional  responsibility,
implying  that  regional  governments  can  enact  laws  relating  to  the  nature  of  land  rights  and  their
transferability  as well as land taxation.  Second, the frequency of land redistribution was to be reduced;  in
fact Tigray  declared  an end  to  administrative  land redistribution  while  Oromia restricted  the  scope for
redistribution to irrigated  land. Finally, rentals have been officially allowed (Pender and Fafchamps 2000)
although  local  leaders  and  governments  seem  to have  great  discretion  to  impose  restrictions  on  land
transfers.  For example, the region of Oromia  allows farmers  to rent out only  up to  50%  of their holding
and' stipulates  maximum  contract terms of 3  years  for traditional  and  15  years  for modem  technologies
(Regional Government of Oromia  2002).
The political  sensitivity of land issues  is illustrated  by the fact that the Government's  Poverty Reduction
Strategy  emphasizes  as  a  guiding  principle  that  every  farmer  who  wants  to  make  a  livelihood  from
farming  is entitled to have a plot of land free of charge (Federal  Republic of Ethiopia 2002). While some
of the issues, such as the need for greater tenure  security and land rental, are mentioned,  there  is no  clear
policy directive and instead responsibility is left to regional states.4
2.4 Estimation Strategy
Let  households  be  denoted  by  i  and  the  two  types  of investment,  i.e.  trees  and  terracing,  by j.  The
methodological  discussion  above  then  reduces  to  the estimation  of the relationship  between  Io  and the
level of tenure  security (S,)  and transfer nghts  (T,)  enjoyed by the household,  as well as  a vector of other
characteristics  X,. The general equation to be estimated is
I  = a+ ,  T, + yS, + 77Xi +
The two  investments  represented  by Iv are the  planting of trees  and the  establishment  of terraces  in the
1999-2001  period.  Information  on  whether  such  investment  was  undertaken,  but  not  the  amount  of
investment,  was  elicited  directly  from  respondents,  leading  us  to  adopt  a  probit  specification.  As
discussed,  we  expect  fi,  the net  impact of transferability,  to  be  unambiguously  positive.  By contrast,  r
denotes  the  sum  of  the  productivity  effect  which  increases  with  tenure  security  and  the  "security
enhancement"  effect  that declines in tenure  security.  The sign of ry then,  is indetermninate  and likely to be
4 'In order to protect the user rights of farmers, their land holdings should  be registered  and provided with certificate  of user nghts  In this regard,
a guarantee  may be given  to the effect that land will not be re-divided  for a penod ranging  from 20-30 years  Some regional  states have already
started this aspect of the land use policy and it is a step  in the nght direction."  (Republic of Ethiopia,  2002 p.53; italics added).
9investment-specific.  Indeed,  the possibility of the  two effects  canceling  each other out could account  for
the fact that  much of the  literature  reviewed earlier  does not  find a strong impact of tenure security  on
investment.
We use two types of variables to represent tenure  security S,. The first one relates to the experience of land
redistribution in  1991-1998  inclusively, a period during which redistribution  was discouraged,  though  not
explicitly prohibited, by the state.  This includes  both households  who gained  and who lost land through
redistribution.  To ensure  that the  measure  is  truly  exogenous to  our investment indicators,  we  consider
only redistributions that happened before  1999.  As redistribution  is imposed by local administrators  often
in  response  to  political  pressure,  it  is  safe  to  assume  that  having  had  land  redistribution  in  the  past
increases the likelihood of having another one in the future. We use both a household-specific  indicator of
redistribution  as well as the share of households in the village,  excluding the one under concern,  who were
affected  by  land  redistribution.  In  addition  to  past  redistribution  experience,  we  have  information  on
households'  expectations  about future land redistribution  at the village level which can be expected  not to
be  affected  by  their  individual  investment  decision.5 We  use  this  to  construct  two  dummies,  one  for
households  who  expect  land  in  the  village  to  be  redistributed  within  the  next  five  years  and  one  for
households  who are unsure  about future redistribution,  i.e. those who do  not clearly indicate  that they do
not expect a redistribution  in the future.
Transfer rights T,  are proxied by households'  perception about whether they have the right to mortgage the
land or transfer it permanently through  sale. Even though both are not allowed  by the letter of the law, the
local autonomy results in some gray  zone regarding application of the law. To the extent that they can be
disguised as rentals, temporary "mortgages",  i.e.  transfer of the usufruct in return for a cash transfer on the
understanding  that the  land has  to  be  returned  once  this  credit  has  been repaid  are  likely to  be  easy.
Similarly, a sale can easily disguised as a long-term lease, possibly with  an upfront payment of the "rent",
and may be  tolerated by local authorities.  Other variables  included  in the vector X, include  the per capita
size and  fragmentation  of the household's  land endowment,  the head's  age and  education,  demographic
composition,  and whether the household had access to government-sponsored  extension services.
In addition to exploring  the impact of tenure security  on investment,  it is of interest to explore the impact
of such investment  on productive outcomes  to assess  the extent  to which the issues discussed here  are of
broader economic relevance. To do so, we estimate determinants of net farm income,  Y,, as follows:
Y, = Po 0 + AQ, +/32 Z 1 +  /3  I,,  + r7i
The  fact that  the maximum  share of households  who were  affected  by redistnbution at the  woreda level  was about 75%  clearly illustrates that
havmg a  redistnbution  does  not  mean  that  every household  will be affected.  This  implies  that,  while  households'  investment  decisions  are
unlikely  to  alter  the  probability  of aggregate  redistnbution,  they  are  likely  to  be  affected  by  households  expectations  about  village  level
redistnbution  in the future
10where  Y,  denotes  net revenue  from farm crop  and livestock production,  i.e. the difference  between  total
output  and variable  cash  costs  including  spending  on hired  labor,  animals,  machinery  rental  and fixed
factors, but excluding family labor.  Q, is a vector of inputs and  fixed factors (i.e.  land cultivated  and the
land  and  labor  endowments)  and  Z,  is  a  vector  of household  characteristics  including  education  and
whether the household  has a non-farm wage job. Finally,  I,.  denotes the predicted value of investment j
as derived from a linear probability model, as is commonly applied in the literature.
3. Data and descriptive statistics
Our  empirical  estimation  is  based  on  a  nationally  representative  survey  of  8,540  farm  households
conducted  in  2001  by  the  Ethiopian  Economic  Association's  Economic  Policy  Research  Institute
(EEA/EEPRI).  The  sample  was  chosen  to  represent  the country's  main  agro-ecological  regions  and  to
account  for differences  in population  density,  farming  systems,  and  access  to markets.  We  use them to
provide descriptive  statistics, for the country  as a whole  and its major regions, Tigray, Amhara,  Oromia,
SNNPR,  and  the mainly  pastoral  areas  of Benshangul-Gumz,  Afar and Somali  which  we  classify under
"others".  Descriptive  evidence  demonstrates  the  importance  of tenure  security  but  also  suggest  that
changes  in these arrangements could have an important  impact on economic outcomes.
3.1 Household  characteristics
General  household  characteristics  point  towards  a  high  level  of poverty,  dependence  on  agricultural
income,  and  considerable  rationing  in  labor-markets.  Table  1 illustrates  that  the  average  household  is
composed of 5.11 persons (in adult equivalents),  primarily male-headed (only 8% are headed by females),
and has a head who is 45.3  years old. Illiteracy among the older generation  is pervasive; in fact only 28%
of the  household heads  in the  sample  are  literate  although  the  much  higher  level  of formal  education
among the younger generation  testifies to the rapid recent expansion of educational opportumities.  In fact,
the  most educated  person in a  household  has,  on average,  5.18  years of schooling,  varying between  3.9
years in pastoral areas and 5.78 in Oromia.
Income  data, although less than ideally measured,  suggest that 54%  of the households have  income below
the national poverty line,  with considerable  regional  variation;  6  26%  of the households  reported to have
received food aid during the survey year and  12%  got remittances or help from others. The fact that, with
75%  of  the  total  (out  of which  72%  cam  from  crop  farming),  agriculture  made  a  very  important
contribution  to  household  income,  highlights  not  only  the  potentially  large  impact  of  increasing
6  It  is admitable that this highest share of populaton below poverty  line in Southem regions may be due to underestimation  of the value of Enset
production  which is a dominant crop produced in the region mainly for home consumption
IIagricultural  investment  and  land  productivity  on  household  welfare  but  also  implies  that  exploring
agricultural activities  in more detail will be appropriate.
3.2 Agricultural activities  and Rand tenure arrangements
Data on  agricultural  production  activities  in the bottom  panel of table  1 illustrate  that  the average  land
holding per  household  is, with  1.01  ha on 2.36  plots  (or 0.18  ha per  capita),  very small,  with  regional
variations  (from  0.51  ha in  Tigray to  2.25  ha in predominantly pastoral  areas).  Only 22% of households
reported  that their current  holding  allows  them  to  obtain  food self-sufficiency  and  39%  consider  land
shortage  to  be  the major  constraint  to  increased  agricultural  production,  suggesting  that expanding  the
effective  land area  through  land-related  investment  should  indeed  constitute  an  attractive  option.  71%
report having one or more oxen, something less dominant (with 45%) in the South where hoe culture and
perennial cropping systems dominate.  35% of farmers participated in the government  sponsored extension
program which is linked  to the provision of improved seed, fertilizer,  and chemicals  - which  are used by
37%,  13% and  10% of households,  respectively.  Land productivity,  at about  170 US$/ha (1458  ETB/ha)
on average, is lowest (123  US$) in the Southem regions and highest in (288 US$) in Tigray.
Information on subjective  land rights perceived by the farmers,  their land  tenure preferences,  as well  as
actual and hypothetical  investrnent in land improvements  in table  2 suggests not only that tenure  security
remains low but also that most farmers would prefer higher levels of land tenure security.  Although many
producers have undertaken  land-improving investment,  a surprisingly large  share declares that they would
change  their fanming  practices  and undertake  more  investments  if land tenure were  changed  to provide
more tenure security to cultivators.
In the  1991-98 period, 9% of the farmers nationally and  18%  in Tigray and 21 % in Amhara were  affected
by land redistribution.  Although there  is an intent for policy to  discourage  such practices, there is neither
a law nor a clear policy statement at the national level to eliminate  or prohibit land redistribution.  In fact,
only 27% of farmers are confident that there will not be a land redistribution  in the future and 9% expect
one  to  happen within  the  next 5 years.  23% report to  have  conflicts  with local  authorities  that revolve
around land redistribution,  again illustrating  that tenure insecurity in Ethiopia remains  high. With respect
to transfer  rights, we note  that more than  91% of farmers  indeed perceive  the right to rent or sharecrop
whereas  23% indicated that they would be able  to temporarily mortgage their  land and 4% indicated  that
they would be able to permanently  transfer the rights to their land through sale.
Given the  high levels of tenure insecurity  and restricted  transfer rights,  it is not surprising  to find strong
support for more  secure rights;  in fact 79% of farmers nation-wide  (83%  and 84% in Tigray and Amhara)
indicate that they would prefer an alternative  to the current tenure system. Of these,  48% (61% in Tigray)
12opt for higher levels of tenure security while maintaining  state ownership  whereas 31%  (38%  in Amhara)
indicate  to  prefer  a  transition  towards  private  land  ownership.  It  is  also  worth noting  that  4%  of the
population (10%  in Amhara)  would prefer  a system that offers  regular redistribution  of land  while  17%
see the current system as the most desirable alternative.'
Even  at the descriptive  level,  there is evidence  that transition to private rights would lead to significantly
higher levels of investment;  47% of the farmers  interviewed  (68% in the pastoral regions)  indicated that
they  would  undertake  investments  or  change  their  land  management  practices  if land were  privatized.
Specifically  81% of those who would make improvements (or 38% of the total sample) indicated that they
would build terraces, 28%  (13% of  the total sample) would plant trees, and 23% (11%  of the total sample)
would adopt conservation  and land improvement practices recommended by extension.
Of course,  framing  may  easily  affect  the  results  of such  hypothetical  questions  (Kahneman  2000;
Druckman  2001;  Rolfe  et al.  2002).  This  makes  it  essential  to  complement  descriptive  evidence  with
analysis  of real-world actions.  Doing  so can not only help  to assess whether  security  of property  rights
has a statistically significant impact but also to relate it to other variables of interest. Before discussing the
results from  our  analysis,  we note  that the investments  used  as  dependent variables  in our analysis  are
indeed sufficiently  frequent in the  sample so  as to make  such analysis meaningful.  As illustrated  in the
bottom of table 2,  47% of the farmers  reported  that they have  practiced terracing  during  the recent  2-3
years  with  participation  varying  between  20%  in  pastoral  areas  and  88%  in  Amhara;  similarly  39%
reported that they had planted trees during the same period.
4. Econometric  estimates
Our empirical discussion focuses first on determining  the impact of land rights and subjective perceptions
of tenure  security  on  tree  planting  and  terracing.  Based  on this  we then  estimate  the  potential  impact
which  greater  tenure security  or transferability  could,  through higher  levels  of land-related  investment,
have on  agricultural  productivity  and  thus  household welfare.  Although  we  find that investments  with
limited impact  on productivity  may be undertaken  to  enhance  tenure  insecurity,  there  is strong evidence
for a significant and quantitatively  large investment-enhancing  effect of higher tenure security.
7 Satisfaction  with  the current  system  was measured  with  a sequence  of three  questions,  namely  (i) by  first asking farmers  whether they are
satisfied  with  the  current  system,  a  question that  was  answered  affirmatively  by  61%;  (it)  by then  obtaining  the  same  information  for  other
villagers ("Do you think other villagers are  satisfied with the current system",  a question answered affirmatively by only 30%, and (iii) by finally
inquinng  whether  they  would prefer  any altemative  to  the current  system, giving  different  options.  As there  is  strong reason  to  believe  that
households  will  overstate  their  support  for  the  system,  and  since  they  can  be satisfied  even  if they  think  that  there  would  be  a not  better
altemative, we use the last one for our analysis.
134.11  Determinants of land-related investment
To  deal  with  concerns  about  possible  endogeneity  in  households'  subjective  assessment  of  tenure
security,  we  first  present  a  "basic"  model  that  includes  only  the  level  of past  redistribution  (at  the
individual or the village level)  as right hand side variables.  This simple model  is then complemented by a
more  expanded  set  of right hand  side  variables  containing  information on land  transfer rights as well as
households'  expectation  regarding  future  village-level  redistributions.  The  results  allow  to  draw  a
number of conclusions.
First,  we  note  that,  as  one  would  expect  if  land  rights  are  endogenous,  having  been  affected  by
redistribution in the past,  has a strongly positive impact on planting of trees (column  1 of table  2). While
this positive sign appears for both, whether the individual was affected by redistribution,  and the share of
households  in the woreda who  either lost or gained  land through redistribution  (equations  not reported),
entering  both  variables  simultaneously  suggests  that the  village-level  variable  is  empirically  of greater
importance.8 The point estimate  implies  that,  for  the mean  woreda in the  sample  where  about  8% of
households  were  affected  by redistribution,  the  propensity  for  tree  planting  is  2%  higher than  in  one
where there was no redistribution after 1990.
In  the case  of terracing,  the exact  opposite  is true,  i.e  past redistribution  is  found to  greatly  discourage
investment,  presumably  through the higher tenure  insecurity brought about by this experience.  Column 2
illustrates  that the magnitude  of the estimated coefficients  is several  times than  for tree  planting  and that
both individual and woreda level experience of redistribution are of significance.  A household affected by
land redistribution  will,  according to  the estimates,  be 7%  less likely to invest in terracing than one who
was not  and that  the  propensity  to  invest  is reduced by  2%  for households  in  a woreda with  the  mean
level  (8%)  of  land  redistribution  in  the  sample,  as  compared  to  a  woreda without  redistribution,
irrespectively  of whether  the  households  were  themselves  affected  or not.  Also,  contrary  to  what  one
might expect,  the household-specific  effect  of past redistribution is not limited to those who lost land;  in
fact  even  though  the point  estimates  are  close  to  each  other,  the  effect  is  much  more  significant  for
households  who gained  land while  being  virtually indistinguishable  from  zero at conventional  levels  of
significance  for  those  who  lost  (results  not  reported).  The  presence  of  land  conflicts,  which  was
insignificant  for tree planting  is negative  and highly significant for terrace  investment,  pointing  again  to
the investment-reducing  impact of tenure insecurity  in the latter case.
The difference  between terracing  and tree  planting  suggests that the  impact  of past redistribution  varies
across  types  of investments,  in  line  with  the notion  that  some  investments  can  be used to  establish  or
t This is  consistent  with this  result that distinguishing  between  households  who received  land and those  who  lost  land makes  little difference
(regression not reported).
14visibly manifest  land rights,  something  that is not more  difficult for others.  Before moving to discuss a
fuller  specification  that includes  transfer  rights,  we  note  that  the  signs  of most  other  variables  in  the
regression  are  as  expected.  Access  to  extension  at  the  village  level  (excluding  the  individual  under
concern to avoid concerns of endogeneity)  promotes both tree planting and building of terraces,  as would
be expected.  Higher  endowments  of family  labor,  especially in the  14-60 year group,  greatly  encourage
both types  of investment,  confirmung  that, with  labor market imperfections,  the presence  of which  was
already noted  in  the descriptive  statistics,  land-related  investment  is a good way  to make better  use of
otherwise  underutilized  family  labor.  Higher  levels  of education  are  also  estimated  to  increase  the
propensity to invest, although the magnitude of the coefficient  is small.
The regression  also  indicates  that there  seem to be few or no wealth-related  barriers to undertaking both
types of investment. Neither ownership of oxen nor the share of household income derived from off-farm
sources,  both  of which could  proxy  for  the  ability  to  overcome  capital  market  imperfections  through
implicit credit,  are  significant.  Per capita  land holding  is negative  in both  cases (though insignificant  for
terracing), highlighting that investmnent to augment land constitutes a strategy that can be used by the poor
to enhance  their incomes.  Fragmentation  of the holding, as measured  by the number  of plots,  is positive
and  significant  in  both  cases,  possibly  because  smaller  plots  may  be  less  likely  to  be  affected  by
redistribution,  because  the  amount  of investment  required  for  these  is  less  (especially  in the  case  of
terracing),  or for other reasons.
Adding transfer rights  and expectations  about  future redistribution to these regressions  (columns  3 and 4
of table 3) highlights  that transfer  rights and  more secure  tenure  for the future  will  increase  investment
incentives.  Being  unsure  about  whether  or  not  a  redistribution  may  happen  in  the  village  reduces  a
household's  incentive to plant  trees and establish terraces  by about  5% and 4% respectively.  The time  at
which  such  redistribution  is  expected  does  not  seem  to  affect  tree  planting  but  for  terracing,  the
expectation  of a redistribution  within the next 5 years  reduces investment  incentives by an  additional  18
percentage points.
Rather large  effects that would be consistent with the descriptive  evidence provided  earlier are also found
for  the  investment  effect  of land  transfer  rights,  over  and  above  those  already  identified  for  tenure
security.9 The ability to mortgage  land will,  according  to our estimates,  increase  incentives  to plant trees
by  7%  and  to build terraces  by 5.5%.  Adding the  right to transfer  land, while not having  a  significant
impact for tree planting,  is estimated to increase  the probability of terracing  by an additional  32 points.
Even  without  accounting  for  elimination  of land  conflicts  (which  would  add  another  6.5  points),  a
9 Analysis of the  data (not reported)  confirms that having secunty of tenure  is indeed a precondition for transfer nghts, i.e. there are  virtually no
people who believe that a redistribution  will happen  within  the next 5 years but who still believe they have the right to transfer their land
15household with fully secure and transferable land rights is estimated to be 59.8%  more likely to invest in
terracing than one who expects  a redistribution in  the village within the next 5 years.  At the same time,
the incentive  to plant trees is actually higher in woredas where land was redistributed in the past and even
maling land  rights fully  secure  and  transferable  will  increase  the  probability  of tree  planting  by only
about 11%.
Clearly,  then,  the  impact  of  tenure  security  seems  to  depend  on  the  specific  type  of  investment
considered. Also, the fact that the estimated effects  are several  orders of magnitude larger than what has
been  reported  in  the  literature  suggests  that  households'  expectations  affect  their  investment  behavior
even in settings where formal title is, at present,  only a remote  possibility.  One explanation  for the large
difference  to  the existing  literature  is  that in  Ethiopia tenure  is  at present indeed  very  insecure.  At the
same  time,  the  highly  significant  results  illustrate  that  there  is  indeed  need  for careful  assessment of
households'  subjective  assessment  of tenure  security,  in  addition to  careful  assessment  of the  specific
investments that have been undertaken.
4.2 Impact on agricultural  profits
To  illustrate  that,  in  the  case  at  hand,  increasing  tenure  security  could  have  a  perceptible  impact  on
economic  outcomes, we estimate a net income  function with the predicted level of terracing and planting
of trees  for each  household  as  derived  from  a  linear  probability  model  as  right  hand  side  variables,
correcting  for  standard  errors.  As  noted  in the  literature,  doing  so  yields  consistent  estimates  of the
parameters in question (Hoxby  1996; Angrist  1991; Heckman and MaCurdy  1985). Results from doing so
are reported in table 4.
We  note  that,  in  line  with  our  earlier  results  which  suggest  that tree  planting  is  undertaken  less  for
productive  value, the coefficient on tree planting  is negative,  though  not statistically  significant. . Part of
this could be explained  by the fact that trees planted  during the  1999-2001  period would still  be in their
gestation period, thus not making a significant contribution to agricultural output or revenue.  At the  same
time, we note that most of the trees planted were actually eucalyptus which offer very limited potential for
generating marketable  output. Also, concern about a downward bias of the estimated  coefficient because
of trees  not  yet  being  in  their productive  stage  are  allayed  by  the  fact  that  the  dummy  for having
perennials (mostly coffee) on the plot is also insignificant.'I
Compared to the insignificant results for trees, the impact of terracing is estimated to be both positive and
highly significant,  something that can be explained by the increased water holding  capacity and other soil
conservation  benefits  from  terracing.  We  also note  that  the  statistical  fit of the  production  function  is
'
0The lack of significance  for the perennial dummy can be explamed by the very low coffee prices when the data was collected.
16adequate, with an adjusted R2 of 0.63 and estimated elasticities of 0.46, 0.18,  and 0.15  for land,  labor, and
livestock, respectively.  While  estimation of a simple production  function  suggests that  extension  has a
highly significant  impact on input use  (results not reported),  it does not seem  to increase  profits.  At the
same  time,  education  by  the  household  head  as  well  as  the  children  has  a  positive  effect  while  the
household  head having  an off-farm job, reduces net  revenue  from  agricultural  production,  presumably
because of the limited attention that can be devoted to this.
Although the fact that the survey was not designed with the explicit purpose of collecting  information on
production,  implying for example that we do not have information on stocks of trees or terraces available
to the  household, it allows to  obtain  an indication  of the order  of magnitude  of the effects  that can  be
expected from such investments.  We simulate production outcomes  for different levels of tenure security,
starting with the assurance  that no more  redistribution  will occur to the full transferability of land rights,
and the (possibly somewhat fictitious)  elimination of land conflicts.
Results from the simulation as reported in table 5 illustrate that increasing tenure security can have a clear
impact  on  agricultural  performance.  Through  its  impact  on  investment  in  terraces  alone,  abolition  of
further redistribution  is estimated  to increase annual  output by about  1.5%  overall, with the impact being
lowest  in SNNPR  and highest in Amhara.  Adding transferability  of land rights would,  according  to our
estimates,  increase  output by an additional 4.4%.  Taken together,  and capitalized  into future land values
at  a  standard  rate  of discount,  the  security-induced  increase  in terrace  investment  alone  could  thus
increase land values by about 5%, quite apart from improvements associated with other investments or the
improvement  in allocative efficiency  and productivity  associated with higher levels of transferability.  All
of this suggests  that, in the case of Ethiopia,  improving  security of land ownership and transferability  of
land can have  a significant impact  on overall  output and household  welfare. This is of particular  interest
in view of the fact that the high levels of underemployment  in the sample villages would allow additional
investment be undertaken  at very low additional cost to the economy.
5.  Conclusion  and policy  implications
The  evidence from  Ethiopia presented  here adds to  the literature  on land rights and investment  in three
respects. First, we show that the impact of land rights on investment incentives  varies significantly across
different  types  of improvements  and  the  balance  between  their  productivity-  and  security-enhancing
effect.  This  implies that, even  in  situations where  households  undertake  certain investments  (in our case
tree  planting)  with  the  express  purpose  of  enhancing  tenure  security,  it  can  not  be  concluded  that
government interventions  to better define and enforce  land rights will be superfluous.  To the contrary,  in
Ethiopia, households'  efforts  to  increase  tenure  security  through visible  investments remain  ad hoc and
need not be socially efficient (De Meza  and Gould  1992). While  registration of land rights without prior
17legal clarification of the nature of such rights may not increase tenure security, a clear policy statement as
to the nature  of land rights would not only  do so but could also provide tenure  security  in a more-cost
effective way, thereby  freeing households to focus on truly productivity-enhancing  activities.
Second, while most of the literature has not differentiated  between  tenure security and transferability  but
treated them largely as interchangeable,  we find that, while both are important, transferability  has a larger
impact on households'  investment incentives  in the context studied here.  Exploration of the determinants
of households'  perception of their land rights would be of interest to uncover possible reasons underlying
this rather surprising phenomenon and the implications it has for land policy. It also implies that attention
to the scope, determinants, and impact of different modalities of land transfers would be warranted.
Third,  in addition to the  robustness of the  investment-enhancing  impact  of greater  tenure  security  and
transferability  of land  rights  across  specifications,  the  magnitude  and potential  productivity-enhancing
impact  of this  effect  is  surprising  and  in  contrast  to  most  of  the  recent  literature  which  finds  that
investment  effects,  if at  all  significant,  are  often  quantitatively  very  small.  We have  already  noted  that
most  of these  conclusions  are  based  on  short  term  investments  using  relatively  small  and  regionally
concentrated  samples.  Methodologically,  it would be of considerable  interest to explore  whether  a focus
on investment  with  a longer gestation period,  incorporation  of producers'  subjective perception  of their
land rights, and greater regional variation,  may lead to a revision of the conclusions  from this literature in
other African  countries  as well.  These  issues notwithstanding,  our results  highlight  not  only that  land
rights in Ethiopia are highly insecure but also that higher tenure security and transferability could enhance
investment  and  agricultural  productivity.  Trying  to  identify  and  implement  measures  to  increase
producers' tenure security could have a large pay-off in terms of rural productivity and poverty reduction.
18Table  1: Basic characteristics of the sample
Region
National  Tigray  Amhara  Oromia  SNNPR  Others
Household characteristics
Household  Size (adult equiv)  5.11  4.81  4.45  5.24  5.57  5.14
Members younger than  14 years  2.72  2.51  2.35  2.73  3.05  3.16
Members  14-60 years  3.50  3.29  3.01  3.65  3.77  3.33
Members older than 60 years  0.19  0.24  0.21  0.19  0.20  0.09
Age of household head  45.30  48.87  46.10  44.60  45.94  41.47
Head illiterate  72%  82%  74%  66%  79%  84%
Max. years of education  5.18  4.65  4.55  5.78  4.98  3.91
Female headed  8%  17%  11%  6%  6%  2%
Income and its composition
IncomeinUS$  207.9  198.0  181.5  216.9  110.4  248.3
Poor  54%  41.6%  48.9%  50.4%  83.6%  33%
Share from agriculture  75%  72%  79%  76%  68%  72%
Share from crop farming  72%  67%  75%  74%  61%  30%
Has non-agncultural  income  25%  28%  21%  24%  32%  28%
Would like wage employment  73%  65%  67%  73%  84%  70%
Employment locally available  22%  55%  18%  20%  15%  38%
Received  food aid  26%  56%  37%  9%  44%  29%
Received remittances  12%  16%  12%  10%  13%  14%
Agricultural production
Net Revenue (B/ha)  1458  2465  2132  1082  1056  1722
Total land held (ha)  1.01  0.51  0.75  1.14  0.89  2.25
Land per capita (ha)  0.18  0.10  0.15  0.19  0.15  0.42
Number of plots  2.36  2.46  2.84  2.44  1.77  1.95
Access to extension  35%  50%  41%  39%  20%  14%
Uses fertilizer  37%  43%  37%  43%  30%  8%
Uses improved seeds  13%  2%  14%  14%  9%  23%
Uses chemicals  10%  13%  5%  15%  4%  5%
Own oxen  71%  75%  76%  78%  45%  82%
Land shortage  most important  39%  44%  43%  38%  42%  16%
No. of observations  8162  596  1680  3826  1630  430
19Table 2: Subjective  land rights, tenure security, and investment
Region
National  Tigray  Amhara  Oromia  SNNPR  Others
Land tenure security
Woreda had redistribution since  1990  9%  14%  18%  6%  4%  4%
Affected by redistribution since  1990  8%  17%  20%  4%  2%  4%
Expects redistribution next 5 years  9%  10%  10%  10%  6%  12%
Expects no redistribution  27%  42%  26%  23%  30%  37%
Has land conflict w. authorities  23%  23%  23%  26%  14%  22%
Perceives right to rent/sharecrop  91%  98%  89%  92%  85%  95%
Perceives right to mortgage/inherit  23%  18%  32%  18%  26%  35%
Perceives right to sell  4%  1%  1%  4%  3%  12%
Land tenure preferences
Prefers highertenure securnty  48%  61%  43%  51%  41%  48%
Prefers private ownership  31%  22%  38%  31%  30%  26%
Prefers redistribution  4%  10%  4%  3%  5%  4%
Would invest if land privatized  47%  29%  47%  49%  44%  68%
o  build terraces  38%  24%  41%  39%  35%  56%
o  plant trees  13%  12%  19%  14%  7%  8%
o  adopt other improvements  11%  6%  10%  12%  15%  11%
Actual investment  since 1999
Built or maintained terraces  47%  81%  88%  34%  31%  20%
Planted trees  39%  50%  43%  41%  36%  8%
20Table 3. Determinants of Investments of Land Improvement In the last 2-3 years.
Basic Model  Augmented Model
Planted trees  Built terrace  Planted trees  built terrace
Affected  by redistnbution  1990-98  0.003  -0.071**  0.004  -0.059*
(0.13)  (2.37)  (0.17)  (1.95)
Woreda level redistribution  1990-98  0.235***  -0.239***  0.242***  -0.161**
(4.77)  (3.88)  (4.85)  (2.54)
Perceives nsk of future redistribution  -0.049***  -0.041**
(3.37)  (2.50)
Expects redistributon within 5 years  -0.013  -0.178***
(0.56)  (6.43)
Perceives  right to mortgage land  0.069***  0.055***
(4.54)  (3.20)
Perceives right to sell land  -0.047  0.324***
(1.38)  (10.66)
Has land conflict with authonties  -0.010  -0.075***  -0.013  -0.065***
(0.71)  (4.56)  (0.89)  (3.86)
Extension access (woreda level)  0.191***  0.592***  0.201***  0.623***
(6 61)  (16.33)  (6.90)  (16.99)
Own oxen  0.023  0.011  0.023  0.022
(1.57)  (0.67)  (1.58)  (1.30)
Age of household head  -0.000  -0.002***  -0.000  -0.002***
(0.71)  (3.40)  (0.75)  (2.94)
Members younger than 14 years  0.008**  -0.004  0.008**  -0.004
(2.28)  (1.03)  (2.26)  (0.96)
Members  14-60years  0.014***  0.019***  0.014***  0.018***
(3.16)  (4.04)  (3.23)  (3.75)
Members older than 60 years  0.043**  0.021  0.041**  0.017
(2.51)  (I 08)  (2.39)  (0.86)
Maximum  years of education  0.006**  0.005**  0.006***  0.005**
(3.38)  (2.35)  (3.28)  (2.13)
Per capita land holding (log)  -0.017**  -0.002  -0.016**  -0.006
(2.19)  (0.28)  (2.16)  (0.65)
Number of plots  0.009**  0.021***  0.009**  0 024***
(1.99)  (4.19)  (1.96)  (4.72)
Share of off-farm income in total  0.001  -0.002  0.002  -0.002
(0.87)  (I  37)  (0.91)  (1.51)
Observations  6861  6861  6847  6847
Pseudo-R
2 0.04  0.25  0.05  0.27
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; **  significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%
21Table 4. Instrumental Variable estimation of household  net farm income
Specification
Tree planted  Terrace built  Combined
Planted trees  last 2-3 years  -0.145  -0.329
(0.44)  (0.95)
Built terrace last 2-3 years  0 293*4  0.33144
(1.97)  (2  11)
Log of total cultivated  area (mehr, belg,  0.461*4*  0 460***  0.460*44
perennial)  (26.11)  (25.93)  (25 47)
Log of amount of livestock holding  0.149***  0.149444  0.15044*
(10  62)  (10.56)  (10.41)
Log of household labor force  0.168*44  0.151444  0 178444
(3 69)  (4.11)  (3.81)
Dummy of perennial crop  -0.015  -0.016  -0.016
(0.38)  (0.39)  (0.39)
Woreda has extension  service  1.161  5.585  6.165
(0.38)  (1.47)  (1.57)
Household head worked off-farm  -0.07744  -0.077**  -0.07644
(2.34)  (2.33)  (2.29)
Age of household head  0 001  0.001  0.001
(0.53)  (0.80)  (0.84)
Years of education of household head  0.021*4*  0.021444  0.022***
(3.36)  (3.37)  (3.34)
Maximum years of education of children  0 01044  0.0074  0.00944
(2.40)  (1.92)  (2  11)
Dummy of oxen ownship  0.031  0029  0.038
(0.80)  (0.77)  (0 94)
Constant  7.923444  7.705444  7.734444
(20.41)  (19.31)  (19.01)
Observations  5621  5621  5621
R-squared  0.63  0.63  0.63
Absolute  value of t statistics in parentheses
4  significant at  10%; 44 significant at 5%,  444 significant at 1%
22Table S. Simulation of gains in net farm income due to terracing  resulting from more secure land tenure, different scenarios
Region  Baseline  Threat of  redistribution  Transfer rights  No redistribution and
eliminated; conflicts  resolved  (mortgaging and sale)  Transfer rights
Net income  Net income  Gain in %  Net income  Gain in %  Net income  Gain in %
Tigray  1027.9  1040.8  1.3%  1053.5  2.5%  1064.7  3.6%
Amhara  1143.3  1161.8  1.6%  1194.7  4.5%  1210.3  5.9%
Oromia  1361.6  1382.6  1.5%  1426.1  4.7%  1440.9  5.8%
SNNPR  280.0  282.6  0.9%  290.3  3.7%  292.3  4 4%
National  1093.9  1110 5  1.5%  1142 6  4 4%  1155 0  5.6%
23Appendix: Conceptual model
Consider a two-period  household  model with  periods  indexed  by t. The household's  utility function  is
U(CI, C2) = ln(C1) + gln(C 2),  where  C, and C 2 are consumption level in period  1 and 2  and  Si E [0,1]
is a discount factor.  Let households  be endowed  with fixed  amount of labor  in each period,  i.e.,  Li and
L2,  and a given land-related capital stock in period 1 Ki.  In the first period, the household can employ K,
and labor  I,' to produce  output Y, according to a standard production technology  Y, = f(KI, li"). Labor
not  used  in  agricultural  production  can  be  allocated  to  off-farm  employment  (11)  and  land-related
investments (i'). If land is  not redistributed,  second period production,  Y2  = f  (K2 + g(l/ ), 1'), uses
the same technology with the augmented capital stock  K2 = K 1 + g(l  l)  ) and  12.  All labor not used in
agriculture  will be devoted to off-farm employment.  Tenure insecurity is a probability  p  E [0,1]  that land
is  taken  away  in  the second  period.  We let  P(S 2 (S1 I  l'))  be a  function of tenure  security  in the  first
period  and  assume  that  ap/aS 2 > O,  a2p/ JS2
2 < 0,  DS2 / Si > 0,  aS2 /alII >0, a2S2 /aSI 2 < 0,
a2S22/0 1 alli  < 0,  and  a2S2/aS 1aliI <0.
The household's  utility maximization  problem can be written up as:
Max  U(C1 ,C 2)=ln(C 1)+S8ln(C 2)  (1)
s-t  (1  +r)[(f(KI ,1a) +Iw  11lC1)]+  [P(S2(S1l  Xll))f  (K, + g(lll)X 12a)  + 12ow2 -C2  ] 
and  11  +l1'  +11'  <L,  la + 12 < L2
With separability between consumption and production,  this simplifies to:
Max
la,i'  1  ,  1°  la  1°  (1+r)(f(KI 'la)  + low 1)+P(S 2(Sl,llf))f (KI +g(l  ),la) +l2Ow 2 = 0
s.t.  IIa+  +11  + If  <  Li,12a +12°  <L2
To solve the  maximization  problem,  we will have  the following  first  order  conditions  (FOC) after  the
labor binding conditions  lPa = Li - 1l  - if, and  la = L2  - 12  are substituted into the objective  function.
(Fl) -(1+^)f(Klsl,a)+d(S 2(S,  l)S 2 '(s 1 ,lf)f(KI  +g(la),l')+f  (Ki +g(la),l2)g'(l,  )P 2(S1,l)  =0
For simplicity we assume that g(lf)  is non-decreasing  in II  and abstract from depreciation.
24(F2)  f '(KI,1 1 ')  = w, and
*  ~~~(F3)  f '(K, + g(ll ),1 P) = w2
These allow us to derive comparative  statics for the impact of tenure security on land-related investment.
Case 1: If tenure  security is exogenously given, the second term of (F1) drops out. (F1) becomes:
-(1+ r)f'(K  'la)+ f(K. + g(l[  ),l2 )g'(l)p(S2) = 0
Substituting  (F2) and (F3) in yields:  - (1  + y)w 1 + w2g'(I/  )P(S2 ) = 0
and total differentiation with respect to 11i  and S 2 provides:
g"(V1)w 2p(S2)a11' + W2g'(1,')P'(S2)aS2 = 0
al'  =- g.'(1)P'(S2) >0  (given  g'(.)>O,  p'(.)>Oand g"(.)<  0
as2 g" (11 )p(S2)
This implies that better land security will lead to more invisible land investment.
Case  2:  Suppose  that,  contrary to  the  above,  tenure security  is endogenous.  In the extreme  case  where
investment is only to enhance future tenure security, the third term of (F 1) drops and we obtain
- (1 + r)f  e(Ki, I,I)  + P' (S2 (S  , i )S2 '(S, ,1  )f(K,, I a)=  0
Substituting (F2)  in will reduce  it to  - (I + r)w 1 + p' (S2 (S ,  11' )S2 '(Si ,i  )f (K 1 ,  12  ) = 0
and total differentiation  above with respect to  S, and  III yields:
p"(S2)(aS2/as,  as, +as 2 /al, .al,')S(.)f(K,ll2a)+p,(S2)f(.)(a 2S2 /aiia  as,Ias,  +a2s2 /a,2  2a,I)  ==0
alII  (S2)(aS 2/ asI)+p'(s 2)(a 2s 2 ai as1)  l-S+  H  +  H  0
as,  p"  (S2)(as2 /all)  +p'(S 2 )(a2s2 / ala)  (-)(+)+ (+)(-)
i.e. tenure insecurity will prompt farmers  to mnake investments  as a means of enhancing  security of tenure.
25Case 3: If investments  increase both productivity  and future tenure  security,  the impact of current tenure
security is ambiguous. Total differentiate  (F1) with respect to  Si and Il' allows to express  all  / as, as:
I  ~~~~~I  aa2  II
_  d(S2)S 2Y(SP,i  )f(K2,15)@I%2las)+  +(S 2)f(K 2,7)@  S2/ai  sd)+w 2g'(94 )p(S2)as2 ias1
WI  P'(S2)S2'(S,lf)f(K2IPas 2 i? +g(S2)f(K2 ,I5)@  S 2 /&1[4)+w  't(1i)PS 2)+g'(l4 )g(.X2I4)
which has  an indeterminate  sign.  It can be  seen that  that the combination  of the  first two terms in the
denominator and the first three term in the numerator illustrates  case  1,  while the combination  of the last
term in the denominator  and the last term of numerator give the condition  for case 2. As the two effects
have opposite signs, the net effect of tenure security depends on their relative weight.
Case  4 - Land transfer rights:  To illustrate  the impact  of transfer rights,  at any given  level  of tenure
security,"  we assume a non-zero probability  0 that a household will be affected by a negative  labor shock
(e.g. become sick and thus be unable to cultivate its land).  While we assume that households can rent out
their land at a rental rate r that reflects the value of the land-attached capital stock, i.e.  r = r(K, + g(l')),
greater transferability  is modeled as a proportional  transaction cost  T with O<TSl  so that owners receive
(1-T) r. Maintaining  the notation introduced earlier, the simplified maximization problem is:
Max'l)Stl  1<
la  (1 + )(f(K,l 1)+6f(K 1 +g(l'),L 2)+(1-0)(1-T)r(Kl +g(Il')) s.t  Ii  +11  E  SLX
Substitution of the binding labor constraint and taking the derivative with respect to  11i  yields FOC
- (I  +  )f, (K1,L 1 -II) + fK,(KI + g(l  ),L2)g'(1 1))+(1-61)0-T)r'(KI + g(li ))g'(1/) =0
Total differentiation with respect to T yields:
(1+  )ff,., al +i(f__ 2 g(g'),  +f4g_)aL_  -(l-y)r'gr+(  -6,)-)(r,g'+rg)all  =0
~"aT  aT  aT
>  ai'  (I-6)r'g'  <0
aT  (1  + r)f,,,,. + O(fkAk  (g') 2 +  fk 2g") +(1 -9)(l  - T)(r"g'+r'g")
demonstrating  formally  that  stronger  transfer  rights,  i.e.  lower  transaction  cost  associated  with
transferring out land, will encourage land-related investment.
12 To simplify  the subsequent  presentation  we assume,  without  loss of generality,  that tenure is perfectly secure  In fact,  mspection of the  data
illustates  that the  large majority  of households  who  perceive  the  right to  aansfer  land  are  indeed  convinced  that  these  nghts will  not  be
redistributed through administrative fiat
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